Approved For Reladse 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00900360001-4
TOP SECRET 7 May 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

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7 May 66

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*Communist China: Peking is sharpening its propaganda attacks against domestic opponents of party policies.

In its latest attack, which appeared in a widely publicized editorial in the 4 May Liberation Army Daily, Peking charged that "antiparty, antisocialist elements" have embarked on a new offensive. These elements, the editorial charges, are working hand in glove with "revisionists" abroad, and "in coordination with antiparty activities of the right opportunist elements within the party." The editorial goes on to assert that, as a result, the party is engaged in a "life and death struggle."

These attacks appear to be aimed at professional military men and party cadres who question the enduring wisdom of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine on such matters as the importance of "men over weapons" and party dominance in all fields. Such dissident attitudes will be of increasing concern as the war in Vietnam escalates and as the regime prepares for the departure of Mao Tse-tung from the scene.

Important political figures have not been implicated in this or other recent ideological attacks, and there is as yet little evidence to support speculation in the Western press that the attacks are surface manifestations of a high-level party dispute.

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* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.

UK: Prime Minister Wilson displayed considerable self-confidence when reviewing various world problems with Governor Harriman this week.

[Wilson reiterated his line that economic sanctions against Rhodesia are having an effect, even if they are not yet felt by most white Rhodesians. He was not too optimistic that any solution will emerge from the talks with Rhodesian emissaries in London next week, but observed that after "three or four months" of continued sanctions there could be a return to negotiations with better prospects for success.]

[Wilson confirmed recent indications of a significant shift in British opinion in favor of joining the EEC, and said his government is seriously probing possibilities. George Thomson, minister for relations with Europe, is now touring the continent primarily to consult on NATO matters, but he will also explore attitudes toward British membership in the EEC.]

While saying the UK was completely in step with the US in the NATO crisis, Wilson repeated two of Britain's concerns: that the special problem of Germany in NATO will not lead to an arrangement for nuclear hardware sharing; and a "determination" to win agreement from Germany to purchase enough British goods to offset the entire foreign exchange cost of the British Army of the Rhine.

Wilson again emphasized his "full support" for US policy and tactics on Vietnam, and said his increased parliamentary majority will strengthen his hand in dealing with leftwingers in his party. He had no new ideas on how to get Hanoi to a conference table.

France-NATO: The French are saying that the terms set forth in the West German note of 3 May for the retention of French forces in Germany are unacceptable as a basis for negotiation.

Couve de Murville told the Belgian foreign minister that acceptance of Bonn's conditions would, in effect, constitute "integration in another guise." Couve indicated that no substantive French reply to the note was required.

On the question of what would happen if the Frenchimposed 1 July deadline for the withdrawal of its forces in Germany from NATO commitment passed without a settlement being reached, Couve indicated that any problems could be solved through bilateral negotiations. The Belgians concluded that Paris intends to leave its forces in Germany without additional agreements in the absence of a further German initiative.

During a meeting with his West German counterpart earlier this week, French Armed Forces Minister Messmer reportedly said that France was prepared to keep its forces in Germany on the basis of the 1954 agreements and was not demanding anything.

Nigeria: The widespread enthusiasm engendered by the army coup of last January is being supplanted by growing dissatisfaction.

Current discontent focuses particularly on the sharp rise in the prices of some staple foods as a result of shortages in urban markets. Government action and explanations appear to be widely regarded as inadequate, although in fact the regime can probably do little to alleviate the situation which seems likely to persist at least until the next harvest in August. The food issue will almost certainly be exploited increasingly by labor unions which have in recent weeks begun to resume more militant action for the first time since the coup.

The regime continues to face problems within the army itself. Much of this revolves around the unsettled fate of the controversial group of younger officers who initiated the January coup and are now under detention. Caught between the aroused partisans and critics of these conspirators, General Ironsi, the cautious regime leader, will probably try to temporize indefinitely. In doing so he risks adding to his reputation for indecisiveness. At some point this image might help prompt a move by other officers to depose him.

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Czechoslovakia: The Czech Government apparently will buy US long-range jet transports if the terms are competitive.]

Czech air transport officials reportedly will recommend that a \$30-million contract be awarded to Douglas Aircraft Corporation if it will meet credit terms offered by the British Vickers firm

Last year the Czechs reportedly had intended to buy three Soviet IL-62s. After a visit by Douglas officials in February and the failure of Soviet air transport officials to accept an invitation--originally proposed by the Soviets--for discussions in Prague, the Czechs apparently decided to deal with Douglas.

If a contract with Douglas is signed, it will be a reflection of Prague's strong determination to trade more on an economic rather than a political basis. It will probably also lead to a request for US approval of a Prague - New York route for Czechoslovak Airlines. 7

Despite domestic propaganda which described President Johnson's 3 May speech as an attempt to exert "political pressure" on the unity of Communist countries, the reported decision strongly suggests that in practice the Czechs will continue to seek improved economic relations with the US.

NOTES

UK-Aden: London is making yet another attempt to get constitutional talks started in the South Arabian Federation by urging federal rulers to accept publicly the UN resolution on self-determination and to call for a broadly based provisional government. British planners hope a provisional government will include defectors from Egyptian-backed "liberation" groups, as well as federal officials and some more moderate Adenis. Radical Adeni nationalists, however, almost certainly will oppose this British initiative.

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